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Life, Liberty, or Your Children:  California Parents’ 
Fifth Amendment Quandary between Self-
Incrimination and Family Preservation 
Kendra Weber* 
INTRODUCTION 
“For years, the courts have been the unseen partners in child welfare—yet they 
are vested with enormous responsibility.”1 
At any given time in the United States, more than half a million child-
ren are in government custody.2  One out of every twenty children will en-
ter such custody.3  Child protective agencies responding to allegations of 
child abuse and neglect routinely violate the constitutional rights of child-
ren and their parents.4  Juvenile dependency courts must step in to formally 
determine whether the alleged abuse or neglect occurred and whether a 
child should be returned to the home.5  These specialized courts are 
charged with protecting the rights of all parties involved, including par-
ents.6  However, dependency courts frequently compound the problem 
when they overlook and, at times, blatantly deny parents their Fifth 
Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination.7 
Depending upon the allegations, some parents may face not only the 
possibility of losing their child, but also the threat of criminal prosecution.8  
 
* J.D. Candidate 2009, Chapman University School of Law.  B.A. Criminal Justice, California 
State University, Fullerton.  I would like to thank Frank Ospino for introducing me to the issues facing 
families in the dependency system.  I would also like to thank Paul DeQuattro for all of his research 
guidance, insight, and encouragement.  Finally, I thank my loving family for their never-ending support, 
especially my parents and Symphony, who have all been so patient with me. 
 1 THE PEW COMMISSION ON CHILDREN IN FOSTER CARE, FOSTERING THE FUTURE: SAFETY, 
PERMANENCE AND WELL-BEING FOR CHILDREN IN FOSTER CARE 13 (2004) [hereinafter THE PEW 
COMMISSION]. 
 2 Id. at 9. 
 3 State Efforts to Comply with Federal Child Welfare Reviews: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Human Res. of H. Comm. Ways & Means, 108th Cong. 54 (2004) (statement of Rep. Baca from Cali-
fornia), available at http://eric.ed.gov/ERICDocs/data/ericdocs2sql/content_storage_01/0000019b/80/ 
28/07/29.pdf [hereinafter State Efforts]. 
 4 Id.  (“[T]he unwarranted seizure of children from non-neglectful homes has become a national 
problem of staggering proportions.”). 
 5 THE PEW COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 13. 
 6 See NAT’L COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY, JUVENILE JUSTICE POLICY STATEMENT 3 
(Apr. 1991). 
 7 E.g., In re Mark A., 68 Cal. Rptr. 3d 106, 108 (Ct. App. 2007); In re Joanna Y., 10 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 422, 426 (Ct. App. 1992). 
 8 For example, when a dependency petition alleges domestic violence against a spouse or part-
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These parents are forced into the Hobson’s choice9 between cooperating 
with the dependency court at the expense of their Fifth Amendment privi-
lege or preserving the privilege and losing their child.  The paramount con-
cern of the dependency system is the best interest of the child, and it is in 
the best interest of the child that the parent testifies.10  However, “[t]he 
mere existence of a civil regulatory system may not trump the essence of 
the Fifth Amendment.”11  Furthermore, without a guarantee that their testi-
mony will not be used against them in a criminal case, many parents will 
decline to testify.12  Thus, courts must be able to compel parents to testify 
without violating the Fifth Amendment. 
Part I of this comment discusses parents’ Fifth Amendment privilege 
and its application in dependency proceedings.  Part II presents an over-
view of California’s dependency system and exposes its true punitive na-
ture—the focus on the alleged wrongdoing of the parent and the threat of 
losing his or her child.  Part II further demonstrates how two fundamental 
rights collide when parents are essentially forced to waive their Fifth 
Amendment privilege or forfeit their parental rights.  Part II argues that 
parents must be able to safely testify in dependency proceedings to ensure 
the disclosure of all relevant information in each child’s case. 
Part III analyzes how dependency courts may compel parents to testify 
despite their assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege.  Under California 
law, the only constitutional method available is to grant immunity that 
shields the testimony, and any evidence derived from it, from use against 
the parent in a subsequent criminal case.  However, dependency courts may 
not grant such immunity on their own motion, but must instead cooperate 
with the very agency that may wish to prosecute the parent for a crime.13  
 
ner, a child may be removed from the home, and the allegedly offending parent may also be guilty of a 
felony.  In re Heather A., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 315, 321 (Ct. App. 1996) (finding that domestic violence in 
the household where a child lives is grounds to remove the child); CAL. PENAL CODE § 243(e)(1) (West 
2008) (providing increased criminal  sanctions  “[w]hen  battery  is  committed against a spouse, a person 
with whom the defendant is cohabiting, a person who is the parent of the defendant's child, former 
spouse, fiancé, or fiancée, or a person with whom the defendant currently has, or has previously had, a 
dating or engagement relationship”);;  id. § 273.5(a) (making it a felony to inflict corporal injury result-
ing in a traumatic condition upon one’s spouse, former spouse, cohabitant, former cohabitant, or the 
parent of one’s child). 
 9 A  “Hobson’s  choice”  refers  to  a  choice  where  there really is no choice at all, because both op-
tions are unacceptable.  Its use arose from the tale of Tobias Hobson, an English stable keeper who of-
fered   riders   the   “choice”  between   the  horse   closest   to   the  door  or   no  horse   at   all.      JOHN BARTLETT, 
FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS: A COLLECTION OF PASSAGES, PHRASES, AND PROVERBS TRACED TO THEIR 
SOURCES IN ANCIENT AND MODERN LITERATURE 857 (Little, Brown & Co. 9th ed. 1903). 
 10 See Collins v. Superior Court, 141 Cal. Rptr. 273, 277 (Ct. App. 1977) (noting the “clear  legis-
lative policy . . . that all relevant evidence should be disclosed in proceedings of this nature in order to 
protect the paramount interest of the safety and welfare of the child.”). 
 11 In re Ariel G., 858 A.2d 1007, 1014 (Md. 2004); see also In re Welfare of J.W., 415 N.W.2d 
879, 883–84 (Minn. 1987) (holding that the ability to assert a constitutional right does not yield to the 
best interests of a child). 
 12 E.g., In re Mark A., 68 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 110–11 (involving a father who refused to testify de-
spite a court order). 
 13 The current procedure calls for the involvement of the criminal prosecutor in the decision to 
grant use and derivative use immunity.  CAL. CT. R. 5.548. 
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When the prosecuting agency prefers that such immunity not be granted, 
the court may be left without evidence that is crucial to an informed deci-
sion in the case.14 
Because there is currently no avenue available that allows parents to 
voluntarily testify in their child’s case without risking their Fifth Amend-
ment privilege, Part IV argues for a legislative grant of blanket use and de-
rivative use immunity for all parents in all dependency matters without in-
volving the criminal prosecutor.  This part further argues that, for such 
immunity to be fully effective, and to alleviate any resulting prosecutorial 
burden,15 criminal prosecuting agencies must be excluded from dependency 
proceedings.  Such protection will dissolve the unacceptable choice facing 
parents who wish to cooperate with the court and reunite with their children 
without forfeiting their Fifth Amendment privilege. 
I.  THE FIFTH AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-
INCRIMINATION DIRECTLY APPLIES TO PARENTS IN JUVENILE 
DEPENDENCY PROCEEDINGS 
In some circumstances, the alleged conduct that brings a child within 
the jurisdiction of the juvenile dependency court may also constitute a 
crime.16  The Fifth Amendment provides: “No person . . . shall be com-
pelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”17  When par-
ents face not only the possibility of losing their child, but the additional 
threat of criminal prosecution, they are afforded the same Fifth Amendment 
protections as a criminal defendant and may properly refuse to testify in 
their child’s dependency case.18 
In order to successfully invoke Fifth Amendment protection, an indi-
vidual’s statement must be compelled and self-incriminating.19  The self-
incrimination element is met whenever a witness’s answers would merely 
“furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute the [witness]” 
for a criminal offense.20  The United States Supreme Court has not limited 
 
 14 The prosecutor is permitted to show cause why such immunity should not be granted.  Id. 
 15 See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 460 (1972) (affirming that a grant of immunity 
“imposes  on  the  prosecution  the  affirmative  duty  to  prove  that  the  evidence  it  proposes  to  use  is  derived  
from a legitimate source wholly independent of  the  compelled  testimony.”). 
 16 See supra note 8. 
 17 U.S. CONST. amend. V.  The Fifth Amendment applies to the states via the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964).  Similar protections are guaranteed by the Cali-
fornia Constitution and state statutes.  CAL. CONST.,  art.  I,  §  15  (“Persons  may  not . . . be compelled in a 
criminal cause to be a witness against themselves.”);;  e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 940 (West 2007)  (“To  the  
extent that such privilege exists under the Constitution of the United States or the State of California, a 
person  has  a  privilege  to  refuse  to  disclose  any  matter  that  may  tend  to  incriminate  him.”). 
 18 In re Mark A., 68 Cal. Rptr. 3d 106, 120 (Ct. App. 2007); see also McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 
U.S.  34,  40  (1924)  (affirming  that  the  Fifth  Amendment  privilege  “applies  alike  to  civil  and  criminal  
proceedings,  wherever  the  answer  might  tend  to  subject  to  criminal  responsibility  him  who  gives  it.”). 
 19 Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 408 (1976). 
 20 Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951); see also People v. Mincey, 827 P.2d 388, 
408 (Cal. 1992) (acknowledging that a person may invoke the constitutional privilege against self-
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the Fifth Amendment privilege to a defendant testifying during a criminal 
trial, but has broadened its scope to “any other proceeding, civil or crimi-
nal, formal or informal, where the answers might incriminate him in future 
criminal proceedings.”21  Furthermore, the California Legislature recogniz-
es the overlap in certain classes of criminal and dependency statutes22 and 
expressly acknowledges the application of the Fifth Amendment privilege 
in juvenile dependency proceedings.23  Given the broad scope of the privi-
lege and its clear implications in certain dependency matters, a parent in a 
juvenile dependency proceeding is entitled to the full protections afforded 
by the Fifth Amendment, regardless of whether criminal charges have been 
filed.24 
II.  CALIFORNIA DEPENDENCY PROCEEDINGS IMPROPERLY 
COMPEL PARENTS TO WAIVE THEIR FIFTH AMENDMENT 
PRIVILEGE TO PROTECT THEIR PARENTAL RIGHTS 
Dependency cases are among the most difficult to manage.25  They in-
volve numerous participants, multiple parties with potentially conflicting 
interests, and a complex, ongoing court process.26  A dependency court 
should “function on a socio-legal basis where the constitutional rights of 
children and parents are not abridged, and where the purpose of the court is 
therapeutic and preventive, rather than retributive and punitive.”27  Thus, 
not only are parents entitled to the protections afforded by the Fifth 
Amendment, they must also be allowed to fully participate in their child’s 
case.  However, under California dependency law, parents who face the 
risk of criminal prosecution are forced to choose between the two.28  This 
Hobson’s  choice violates the fundamental rights of parents and their child-
ren and renders dependency courts ineffective. 
A. Juvenile Dependency Proceedings are Quasi-Criminal in Nature 
Juvenile dependency proceedings are considered civil rather than 
criminal, because their primary purpose is not to punish parents, but to pro-
 
incrimination for reasons other than guilt). 
 21 Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973). 
 22 See supra note 8. 
 23 See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §  311(b)   (West   2007)   (“In   the  hearing   the  minor,  parents  or  
guardians, have a privilege against self-incrimination.”);;  CAL. CT. R. 5.674(d)  (“At  the  detention  hear-
ing, the child, the parent, and the guardian have the right to assert the privilege against self-
incrimination.”);;  id. 5.534(k)(1)(A) & 5.682(b)(2) (2008) (both providing that the court must advise the 
parent in dependency cases of the right to assert the privilege against self-incrimination). 
 24 Turley,  414  U.S.  at  77  (providing  that  the  Fifth  Amendment  applies  in  “any other proceeding”  
where  the  testimony  “might incriminate [the witness] in future criminal  proceedings”)  (emphasis add-
ed). 
 25 NAT’L CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, CALIFORNIA JUVENILE COURT IMPROVEMENT PROJECT 
(1997), available at http://www.abanet.org/ftp/pub/child/carpt.txt (last visited June 3, 2008). 
 26 Id. 
 27 See NAT’L COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY, supra note 6. 
 28 See discussion infra Part II.B. 
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tect the child’s health and safety.29  However, physically removing a child 
from the home interferes with the child’s personal liberty and the right to 
remain with his or her family of origin.30  In turn, parents face significant 
state interference with the fundamental right to raise their children and, ul-
timately, the termination of their parental rights.31  Thus, dependency pro-
ceedings are more accurately referred to as “quasi-criminal.”32  In fact, 
most of the rules governing civil proceedings do not apply,33 and the child-
ren and parents involved are endowed with rights similar to those of a crim-
inal defendant.34 
A dependency case typically begins when the county welfare depart-
ment receives a report alleging child abuse or neglect.  If the assigned so-
cial worker finds the allegations substantiated, he or she may immediately 
remove the child from the home.35  Within two days after the child is re-
moved, the worker must file a dependency petition requesting that the child 
be declared a dependent of the juvenile court.36  After the petition is filed, 
 
 29 In re Mary S.,  230  Cal.  Rptr.  726,  728  (Ct.  App.  1986)  (“Dependency  proceedings  are  civil  in  
nature,  designed  not  to  prosecute  a  parent,  but  to  protect  the  child.”);;  Lois R. v. Superior Court, 97 Cal. 
Rptr.  158,  162  (Ct.  App.  1971)  (“[D]ependency  proceedings  are  civil and have been conducted without 
strict  adherence  to  all  the  formalities  of  a  criminal  trial.”). 
 30 See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 754 n.7, 760 n.11 (1982)  (noting  that  “important liberty 
interests of the child . . .  may  also  be  affected  by  a  [dependency]  proceeding”). 
Witnesses stated that only about three percent of the children who are seized or taken into 
custody were physically abused.  What is even worse they said, is that the children who are 
taken into state custody have an eight to eleven times greater chance of being abused than 
those who remain in their own homes. 
State Efforts, supra note 3, at 54. 
 31 Kramer, 455 U.S. at 753   (finding   that  parents  have  a  “fundamental liberty interest . . . in the 
care, custody, and management of their child,” which is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment).  
Terminating parental rights permanently deprives parents of this fundamental interest.  See CAL. WELF. 
& INST. CODE § 366.26 (Deering 2008). 
32 GARY C. SEISER & KURT KUMLI, CALIFORNIA JUVENILE COURTS PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 2.10[2] (2003) (noting that courts have characterized the dependency system inconsis-
tently—some have viewed  it  as  “civil  in  nature”  while  others  have  viewed  it  as  “quasi-criminal”);;  see 
also In re Kristin  H.,  54  Cal.  Rptr.  2d  722,  737  (Ct.  App.  1996)  (“While  the  parent  in  modern  day  de-
pendency proceedings may not stand in the same shoes as a criminal defendant facing a loss of personal 
liberty . . . to say simply that dependency proceedings are civil in nature fails to acknowledge the fun-
damental difference  between  these  proceedings  and  the  ordinary  civil  action.”). 
In most dependency matters the focus is against the parent and the prospect faced is the 
drastic result of loss of his child.  Although legal scholars may deemphasize the adversary 
nature of dependency proceedings and characterize the removal of the child from parental 
custody as nonpunitive action in the best interests of the child, most parents would view the 
loss of custody as dire punishment. 
Lois R. v. Superior Court, 97 Cal. Rptr. 158, 162 (Ct. App. 1971). 
 33 In re Jennifer  R.,  17  Cal.  Rptr.  2d  759,  764  (Ct.  App.  1993)  (“Dependency  proceedings in the 
juvenile court are special proceedings governed by their own rules and statutes.  Unless otherwise spe-
cified,  the  requirements  of  the  Civil  Code  and  the  Code  of  Civil  Procedure  do  not  apply.”)  (internal  cita-
tions omitted). 
 34 For  instance,  “the parents’ right not to be separated from their child entitles them to appoint-
ment of counsel [under Welfare and Institutions Code section 317], and the same degree of review of 
the  case  on  appeal  as  criminal  defendants.”    In re Mary S., 230 Cal. Rptr. at 728 n.3. 
 35 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 306 (West 2006). 
 36 Id. § 313(a); CAL. CT. R. 5.520(b)(1). 
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the court holds a “detention hearing” to approve the child’s removal.37  
Next, there is a “jurisdictional hearing” to determine whether the alleged 
abuse or neglect occurred.38  The California Welfare and Institutions Code 
requires the court to release the child unless there is a prima facie showing 
of abuse or neglect.39  However, it also provides that evidence of an injury 
alone can be sufficient to declare the child a dependent of the court.40 
When the court makes a finding of abuse or neglect, a “dispositional 
hearing” is held to determine the appropriate course of action.41  The court 
may allow the child to return home but require the family to participate in 
family maintenance services, thus subjecting the family to future hearings 
and investigations by the social worker.42  Generally, if the court orders that 
the child is to remain out of the home, the family must participate in “reuni-
fication services” to resolve the issues determined by the court before the 
child is returned.43  If the parent does not successfully reunify with the 
child within the statutory time limit,44 the court must terminate these ser-
vices and select long-term foster care, guardianship, or adoption as a per-
manent plan for the child.45  At this stage, parents may be forever deprived 
of the care and custody of their child.46  These intrusions into private family 
life, and the potential for permanent destruction of the family unit, make it 
imperative that dependency courts ensure that the fundamental rights of 
children and their parents are not trammeled in the process of resolving 
sensitive family issues. 
B. When Parents Cannot Safely Testify in their Child’s’ Dependency 
Case, they are Forced to Choose between Conflicting Fundamental 
Rights 
The privilege against self-incrimination is designed to avoid the “cruel 
trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt.”47  A parent in a depen-
 
 37 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 315 (West 2006). 
 38 Id. §§ 355, 356. 
 39 Id. § 319. 
 40 Id. §§ 355.1(a), 360(d). 
 41 Id. § 358. 
 42 Id. §§ 360(b), 362.  “Family Maintenance provides support services to prevent abuse/neglect 
while the child remains in his or her home.  Generally, these services include counseling, parent train-
ing, respite care, and temporary in-home  care.”    Child  Abuse  and  Neglect  in  California  (Part  I),  Legisla-
tive   Analyst’s   Office   (Jan.   1996),   http://www.lao.ca.gov/1996/010596_child_abuse/cw11096a.html 
(last visited Sept. 14, 2008) [hereinafter LAO]. 
 43 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 361.5 (West 2006).  “Family Reunification provides support ser-
vices to the family while the child is in temporary foster care. Typically, these services include counsel-
ing,  emergency  shelter  care,  parent  training,  and  teaching  homemaking  skills.”    LAO,  supra note 42. 
 44 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 361.5 (West 2006) (providing a statutory time limit of twelve 
months for a child who was three years of age or older on the date of removal, and six months for a 
child under three years of age, but allowing for an extension up to eighteen months under specified cir-
cumstances). 
 45 Id. §§ 361.5, 366.26. 
 46 Id. § 366.26. 
 47 Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964). 
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dency case also faces the potential loss of the care and custody of his or her 
child.  To expedite dependency matters, California law creates a presump-
tion that the alleged abuse occurred if the parent does not present evidence 
to the contrary.48  Thus, while the burden of proof in a criminal trial is on 
the prosecution, the initial burden in a dependency case essentially falls on 
the parent.49  Because a parent’s decision not to testify may be equated with 
a failure to present evidence,50 which will likely result in the child being 
adjudged a dependent of the court,51 parents are currently compelled to tes-
tify by the threat of losing their child.  Once the court establishes jurisdic-
tion, parents generally must admit to the problem that led to removal before 
the child will be returned, further compelling them to disclose potentially 
incriminating information.52 
The court may also order a parent to participate in therapy as part of a 
family reunification plan.53  While disclosures made in court-ordered thera-
py are confidential,54 mandatory reporting laws require therapists to report 
incidents of child abuse to the proper authorities.55  This leads parents to 
suppress potentially incriminating admissions in court-ordered therapy as 
well.56  Less than full participation in therapy is contrary to the child’s best 
interest because it renders the therapeutic process ineffective.57  In addition, 
the therapist may conclude that a parent who does not admit the alleged 
conduct during treatment, or who appears evasive, is not meaningfully par-
ticipating, and the court may refuse to return the child.58 
 
 48 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 355.1(a) (West 2007) (“Where the court finds that an injury, inju-
ries, or detrimental condition sustained by a minor is of a nature as would ordinarily not be sustained 
except as the result of the unreasonable or neglectful acts or omissions of either parent, . . . that finding 
shall be prima facie evidence). 
 49 While the burden of proof at the initial stages of a dependency matter rests with the agency 
seeking jurisdiction over the child, the presumption of abuse created by Section 355.1(a) shifts the bur-
den of production to the caretaker.  CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §  355.1(c)  (West  2007)  (“The  presump-
tion created by subdivision (a) constitutes a presumption  affecting  the  burden  of  producing  evidence.”)    
Thus, the agency need not present any evidence other than the fact that an injury occurred. 
 50 See In re Mark A., 68 Cal. Rptr. 3d 106, 119 (Ct. App. 2007). 
 51 See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 355.1(a) (West 2007). 
 52 In re Jessica  B.,  254  Cal.  Rptr.  883,  890  (Ct.  App.  1989)  (“[R]eunification  cannot  occur  until  
[the parent] admits abuse and works through appropriate remorseful feelings.”). 
 53 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 361.5(a) (West 2007). 
 54 CAL. EVID. CODE § 1012 (West 2008). 
 55 A   therapist  must   report   child   abuse  when   he   or   she   “has   knowledge   of   or   observes   a   child  
whom  [the  therapist]  knows  or  reasonably  suspects  has  been  the  victim  of  child  abuse  or  neglect.”    CAL. 
PENAL CODE § 11166(a) (West 2008). 
 56 E.g., In re Joanna Y., 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 422, 425 (Ct. App. 1992) (involving a father who re-
fused to undergo a psychological evaluation or participate in counseling due to his pending criminal 
case, despite the fact that he felt  it  “would  have  been  helpful”). 
 57 ELIANA GIL, CAL. HEALTH & WELFARE AGENCY, THE CALIFORNIA CHILD ABUSE REPORTING 
LAW: ISSUES AND ANSWERS FOR PROFESSIONALS 19   (1986)   (“Some   clients  will   never   admit   to   the  
abuse, and therefore make the possibility of obtaining therapeutic  help  minimal.”). 
 58 In re Mark A., 68 Cal. Rptr. 3d 106, 119 (Ct. App. 2007) (“[T]he law may legitimately require 
a parent to admit responsibility for wrongful acts as a condition to be fulfilled in therapy . . . [and] the 
parent's decision  not  to  acknowledge  his  or  her  wrongdoing”  may  result  in  “consequences  occasioned 
by   the   lack   of   cooperation   in   the   reunification   process”).      Lack   of   cooperation   in   the   reunification  
process is likely to lead to termination of parental rights.  See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 366.21(e), 
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Because asserting the Fifth Amendment privilege, whether in the ini-
tial stages of a dependency matter, or later in the reunification process, can 
interfere with parents’ chances of reuniting with their children, parents 
must choose between the fundamental liberty interest in raising their child-
ren59 or their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.  Thus, 
even parents who are not ordered to testify are still effectively “compelled” 
to do so in violation of the Fifth Amendment by the threat of losing their 
child.60 
C. Allowing All Parents to Safely Testify in their Child’s Case will 
Improve California’s Dependency Courts 
In 1997, California’s Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC) re-
leased the California Juvenile Court Improvement Project Report, the cul-
mination of a statewide analysis of the juvenile dependency court system.61  
The recommendations of the 1997 report were general in nature and de-
signed simply to highlight areas for improvement.62  Following the imple-
mentation phase of the initial improvement project, the AOC’s Center for 
Families, Children and the Courts performed a reassessment in 2005.63  Al-
though California made substantial progress since the 1997 assessment, the 
2005 reassessment found that many of the originally identified issues re-
mained64 and specified six guiding principles to further improve Califor-
nia’s dependency system: 
[1] The judicial branch should take a leadership role, and partner with other 
stakeholders at the state and local levels, to improve the experiences of and out-
 
366.22(a)  (West  2007)  (“The  failure  of   the  parent  or   legal  guardian  to  participate  regularly  and  make  
substantive progress in court-ordered treatment programs shall be prima facie evidence that return 
would   be   detrimental.”); id. §   366.26(c)(1)   (“A   finding . . . under Section 366.21 or 366.22, that the 
court has continued to remove the child from the custody of the parent or guardian and has terminated 
reunification services, shall constitute a sufficient basis for termination  of  parental  rights.”). 
 59 See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (“The  fundamental liberty interest of natu-
ral parents in the care, custody, and management of their child does not evaporate simply because they 
have not been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their child to the State.”). 
 60 See In re M.C.P.,  571  A.2d  627,  640  (Vt.  1989)  (finding  that  “the  State  may  not  impose  a  pe-
nalty or sanctions against an individual for invoking the [Fifth Amendment] privilege,”  and  “[t]here  is  
no question that deprivation of custody of a child is a sanction for purposes of the Fifth Amendment.”);; 
cf. Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 85 (1973) (holding  that  “answers  elicited  upon  the  threat  of   the  
loss of employment are   compelled”   and   entitled   to Fifth Amendment protection) (emphasis added).  
Surely, testimony obtained upon the  threat  of  losing  one’s  child  is  likewise  “compelled.” 
 61 NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, CALIFORNIA JUVENILE COURT IMPROVEMENT 
PROJECT REPORT (1997), available at http://www.abanet.org/ftp/pub/child/carpt.txt (last visited June 2, 
2008).  California’s initial assessment took place from 1995 to 1996 and included a comprehensive re-
view of dependency laws, procedures, and practices, as well as public hearings, focus groups, and 
roundtable discussions.  Id. 
 62 Id. 
 63 ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS, CENTER FOR FAMILIES, CHILDREN & THE COURTS, 
CALIFORNIA JUVENILE DEPENDENCY COURT IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM REASSESSMENT 1 (2005), 
available at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/programs/cfcc/pdffiles/CIPReassessmentReport.pdf.  The 
reassessment included a progress report on the original recommendations, a detailed review of depen-
dency courts, and new recommendations for court improvement.  Id. 
 64 Id. at 2–3. 
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comes for children and families in the dependency system, increase permanency, 
and reduce the number of children in the system. 
[2] Dependency hearings must be timely and must provide each party with mea-
ningful notice and an opportunity to be heard.  Sufficient information must be 
accessible and available for informed judicial decision making. 
[3] Courthouse procedures must ensure accountability, efficiency, open commu-
nication, safety, and respect for each party’s rights. 
[4] The dependency system must be staffed by well-trained judicial officers, at-
torneys, and other professionals, who are given the resources and reasonable ca-
seloads to do their jobs effectively. 
[5] National, state, and local collaborative efforts should be increased. 
[6] California courts must ensure their compliance with all relevant state and fed-
eral laws.65 
Consistent with these principles, parents must have a fair opportunity 
to communicate openly with the court and fully participate in reunification 
efforts without forfeiting their fundamental rights.  When parents fear crim-
inal prosecution, they are unlikely to testify in their child’s case or to par-
ticipate in court-ordered therapy.66  Essentially, they hand their children 
over to the mercy of the court.  However, the children who fall into the 
arms of California’s dependency system deserve to have their fate decided 
based upon all relevant information, including that which may only be 
available from their parents’ testimony.  Thus, allowing all parents to safely 
testify in dependency matters not only protects the constitutional rights of 
parents; it also serves the best interests of the child and furthers the goals of 
the dependency system. 
III.  A GRANT OF USE AND DERIVATIVE USE IMMUNITY CAN 
SUPPLANT A PARENT’S FIFTH AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE 
A court may lawfully force a witness to testify over a valid assertion 
of the Fifth Amendment privilege only by granting immunity that protects 
against the use of the testimony, and any evidence derived from it, in a sub-
sequent criminal prosecution.67  The limited form of testimonial immunity 
provided by California Welfare and Institutions Code section 355.1(f) is 
not enough to override an assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege.68  
However, dependency courts frequently misinterpret the law and improper-
ly compel parents to testify without following proper statutory procedures 
to immunize their testimony.69 
 
 65 Id. at 1–2. 
 66 See, e.g., In re Mark A., 68 Cal. Rptr. 3d 106, 108 (Ct. App. 2007) (involving a father who 
refused to testify at a combined jurisdiction and disposition hearing); In re Joanna Y., 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
422, 425 (Ct. App. 1992) (involving a father who refused to undergo psychological evaluation or coun-
seling). 
 67 Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444–46 (1972). 
 68 See discussion infra Part III.B. 
 69 E.g., In re Mark A., 68 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 108 (footnote omitted); In re Brenda M., 72 Cal. Rptr. 
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Under current law, dependency courts may not unilaterally grant the 
constitutionally required level of immunity, nor interpret the statute to ex-
pand the limited immunity originally contemplated by the legislature.70  
Even the exclusionary rule, which makes unconstitutionally obtained evi-
dence inadmissible in a criminal case,71 does not authorize dependency 
courts to compel parents’ testimony merely because it would produce the 
same result as a grant of immunity.72  The exclusionary rule was developed 
to deter constitutional violations, not to justify them.73 
A. Use and Derivative Use Immunity Commensurate with the Fifth 
Amendment Privilege is Required Before a Dependency Court Can 
Compel a Parent’s Testimony 
The Fifth Amendment privilege is not absolute—a witness may be 
compelled in certain circumstances to testify even after invoking the pro-
tections of the privilege.  The Supreme Court has recognized “the fact that 
many offenses are of such a character that the only persons capable of giv-
ing useful testimony are those implicated in the crime.”74  This rings pain-
fully true in dependency matters.  There is a compelling state interest in 
coercing parental testimony, such that all relevant information will be dis-
closed to ensure an informed disposition of the child’s case.75 
Immunizing parental testimony simultaneously allows dependency 
courts to compel a parent to testify and protects that testimony from being 
used against the parent in a criminal proceeding.76  However, the Supreme 
 
3d 686, 687 (Ct. App. 2008). 
 70 See discussion infra Part III.C. 
 71 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655–57 (1961). 
[A] witness protected by the privilege may rightfully refuse to answer unless and until he is 
protected at least against the use of his compelled answers and evidence derived therefrom 
in any subsequent criminal case in which he is a defendant.  Absent such protection, if he is 
nevertheless compelled to answer, his answers are inadmissible against him in a later crim-
inal prosecution. 
Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 78 (1973) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
 72 Some California courts fail to distinguish the exclusionary rule from an official grant of im-
munity and erroneously rely on the possibility of future exclusion to compel a witness to testify over a 
valid assertion of the Fifth Amendment.  Spielbauer v. County of Santa Clara, 53 Cal. Rptr. 3d 357 (Ct. 
App. 2007), review granted, depublished by 159 P.3d 29 (Cal. 2007).  As noted in Spielbauer, this faul-
ty assumption stems from California Supreme Court dicta in Lybarger v. City of Los Angeles, 710 P.2d 
329,  331  (Cal.  1985)  (“As  a  matter  of  constitutional  law,  it  is  well  established  that . . . self-incrimination 
rights are deemed adequately protected by precluding any use of [compelled] statements at a subsequent 
criminal   proceeding.”   (citing  Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77–79 (1973)).  Spielbauer, 53 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d at 373–74. 
 73 Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960) (describing the purpose of the exclusionary 
rule  “to  deter—to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way—
by  removing  the  incentive  to  disregard  it.”). 
 74 Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 446 (1972). 
 75 Collins v. Superior Court, 141  Cal.  Rptr.  273,  277  (Ct.  App.  1977)  (“The clear legislative poli-
cy underlying [current California Welfare and Institutions Code section 355.1] is that all relevant evi-
dence should be disclosed in proceedings of this nature in order to protect the paramount interest of the 
safety and welfare of the child.”). 
 76 Peter Lushing, Testimonial Immunity and the Privilege against Self-Incrimination: A Study in 
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Court long ago declared that immunity which “does not supply a complete 
protection from all the perils against which the constitutional prohibition 
was designed to guard . . . is not a full substitute for that prohibition.”77  As 
such, the power to compel testimony is not absolute and must be accompa-
nied by a minimum level of immunity so as not to offend the Fifth Amend-
ment.78  To be coextensive with the Fifth Amendment privilege, the protec-
tion afforded compelled testimony must leave both the parent and the 
prosecutor in a subsequent criminal case in the same position as if the par-
ent had never testified.79 
In 1892, the Supreme Court found that granting a witness total “trans-
actional immunity” from prosecution satisfies the Fifth Amendment.80  Un-
der a grant of transactional immunity, a witness is absolutely immune from 
being prosecuted for any criminal offense related to the compelled testimo-
ny.81  However, because the prosecutor’s hands become permanently tied 
against bringing any related charge—even if the information is garnered 
from a wholly independent source—a witness who is granted transactional 
immunity is better off than if the testimony had never existed.  Thus, the 
Supreme Court later held that transactional immunity provides more pro-
tection than the Fifth Amendment requires.82 
In 1972, the Court shaped a narrower rule of “use and derivative use 
immunity,” whereby a person compelled to testify may still be prosecuted, 
but neither the compelled statement, nor any evidence derived from it, can 
be introduced in a criminal trial.83  The Court distinguished the requisite 
“use and derivative use immunity” from mere “testimonial immunity”—
immunity that protects the testimony itself (but not its fruits) from being 
used against a witness in a criminal proceeding.84  The Court reaffirmed 
that testimonial immunity alone is not coextensive with the Fifth Amend-
ment and, therefore, testimony cannot be compelled with such a minimal 
grant of protection.85  For testimony to be adequately protected, such that a 
dependency court may compel a parent to testify, the testimony must not be 
used in any manner in a subsequent criminal case—as if it never existed.86 
 
Isomorphism, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1690, 1691–92 (1982). 
 77 Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 585–86 (1892). 
 78 Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444–46 (1972). 
 79 Murphy  v.  Waterfront  Comm’n,  378  U.S.  52,  79  (1964). 
 80 Counselman, 142 U.S. at 585–86. 
 81 AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST PRINCIPLES 57 
(Yale Univ. Press 1997). 
 82 Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 462 (finding   “no   justification   in   reason   or   policy   for   holding   that   the  
Constitution  requires  an  amnesty  grant”). 
 83 Id. at  453  (holding  that  “immunity  from  use  and  derivative  use  is  coextensive  with  the  scope  of  
the privilege against self-incrimination, and therefore is sufficient to compel testimony over a claim of 
the  privilege.”). 
 84 See AMAR, supra note 81,   at   47   (explaining   that   under   a   “testimonial   immunity”   rule,   “the  
compelled words will never be introduced over the  defendant’s  objection  in  a  criminal  trial . . . but the 
fruits of these compelled pretrial words will generally be admissible.”). 
 85 Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 453–54. 
 86 Id. at 462 (concluding that use  and  derivative  use  immunity  “leaves  the  witness  and  the prose-
WEBER 12/22/2008 1:18 PM 
166 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 12:155 
B. California Welfare & Institutions Code Section 355.1 Does Not 
Provide Immunity Commensurate with the Fifth Amendment 
The California Legislature encourages parents to participate in depen-
dency matters by providing limited testimonial immunity.87  California 
Welfare and Institutions Code section 355.1(f) provides: “Testimony by a 
parent, guardian, or other person who has the care or custody of the minor 
made the subject of a [juvenile dependency proceeding] shall not be ad-
missible as evidence in any other action or proceeding.”88  But Section 
355.1(f) fails to provide “protection against that use of compelled testimo-
ny which consists in gaining therefrom a knowledge of the details of a 
crime, and of sources of information which may supply other means of 
convicting the witness or party.”89 
While the testimony itself may not be admissible as evidence in a sub-
sequent criminal prosecution under Section 355.1(f) (mere testimonial im-
munity), nothing prohibits the use of information gained directly or indi-
rectly from the testimony (as would use and derivative use immunity).  For 
example, law enforcement officers could interview potential witnesses dis-
closed by parents to gather information for use against the parents in a 
criminal proceeding.  Because the statutory prohibition against the admis-
sibility of a parent’s testimony does not supplant their Fifth Amendment 
privilege, a parent’s testimony cannot currently be compelled without gua-
ranteeing that neither it nor its fruits will be used in a subsequent criminal 
prosecution.90  In addition, while courts have decided that a parent’s disclo-
 
cutorial authorities in substantially the same position as if the witness had claimed the Fifth Amendment 
privilege . . . [and] therefore is coextensive with the privilege  and  suffices  to  supplant  it.”). 
 87 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 355.1(f) (West 2007).  William Wesley Patton, a leading authority 
on California dependency law, provides a detailed and informative analysis of the legislative history of 
Section 355.1, explaining the addition of subsection (f) and its purpose to encourage, not compel, pa-
rental testimony.  Rethinking the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Child Abuse Dependency Pro-
ceedings: Might Parents Be Their Own Worst Witnesses?, 11 UC DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 101, 125–
27 (2007). 
 88 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 355.1(f) (West 2007) (emphasis added). 
 89 See Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 454 (internal quotes and citations omitted); In re Mark A., 68 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 106, 108 (Ct. App. 2007). 
 90 See Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 449–54.  In Kastigar, the Supreme Court upheld a federal immunity 
statute that provided use and derivative use immunity to witnesses whose testimony was compelled.  Id. 
at 453.  The Court also reanalyzed the Immunity Act of 1868 (“Act”)   that it previously criticized in 
Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892).  Id. at 453–54.  The Act was similar in scope to Section 
355.1(f),  providing  that  “no  evidence  obtained  from  a  party  or  witness  by  means  of  a  judicial  proceed-
ing . . . shall be given in evidence, or in any manner used against him . . . in any court of the United 
States . . . .”     Id. at 449–50 (internal quotations omitted).  In Kastigar, the Court asserted that the Act 
would still be 
plainly deficient in its failure to prohibit the use against the immunized witness of evidence 
derived from his compelled testimony . . . because the immunity granted was incomplete, 
in that it merely forbade the use of the testimony given and failed to protect a witness from 
future prosecution based on knowledge and sources of information obtained from the com-
pelled testimony. 
Id. at 453–54 (internal quotations omitted). 
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sures in therapy are also protected by Section 355.1(f),91 the statute does 
not provide the necessary level of immunity to compel parents to make 
such disclosures. 
C. California Dependency Courts Cannot Unilaterally Grant the 
Necessary Immunity to Compel a Parent’s Testimony 
A dependency court that unilaterally grants a parent use and derivative 
use immunity inappropriately overrides the intent of the legislature and 
possibly the will of the executive.92  For nearly twenty years, dependency 
courts have incorrectly assumed that a parent’s Fifth Amendment privilege 
is sufficiently protected by Section 355.1(f) and have compelled parents to 
testify over a valid assertion of their Fifth Amendment privilege.93  A Cali-
fornia dependency case recently reached the appellate level where it was 
finally confirmed that Section 355.1(f) does not provide immunity com-
mensurate with the Fifth Amendment.94  The appellate court also correctly 
decided that a dependency court cannot unilaterally grant the necessary 
level of immunity to compel parents to testify95 absent a clearly expressed 
grant of such authority by the legislature.96 
The power to write laws rests with the legislature, and the courts must 
adhere to the express intent of the legislature when it grants mere testi-
monial immunity.97  A dependency statute that does not attempt to provide 
 
 91 In re Jessica B., 254 Cal. Rptr. 883, 893 (Ct. App. 1989). 
 92 See CAL. CONST. art.  III,  §  3  (2007)  (“The  powers  of  state  government  are  legislative,  execu-
tive, and judicial.  Persons charged with the exercise of one power may not exercise either of the oth-
ers.”);;  In re Weber,  523  P.2d  229,  240  (Cal.  1974)  (finding  that  “the  power  to  provide  for  the  exercise  
of a grant of immunity [is] essentially a legislative function”  and  “the  decision  to  seek  immunity  is  an  
integral part of the charging process,”  left  to  the  prosecuting  attorneys);;  People v. Honig, 55 Cal. Rptr. 
2d  555,  595  (Ct.  App.  1996)  (noting  that  “the  separation  of  powers  doctrine . . . precludes courts from 
interfering with the executive decisions of prosecutorial authorities.”). 
 93 E.g., In re Jessica B., 254 Cal. Rptr. at 893–94; In re Mark A., 68 Cal. Rptr. 3d 106, 108 (Ct. 
App. 2007). 
 94 In re Mark A.,  68  Cal.  Rptr.  3d  at  108  (finding  that  the  “statutory  immunity  provided  by  section 
355.1(f) is more limited than the Fifth  Amendment  privilege  the  statute  purports  to  replace”). 
 95 Id. at 113 (“[I]f immunity were to be requested by [the social services agency] under [Califor-
nia Rule of Court] 5.548(d), the court must require notice to be given to the district attorney, particular-
ly where, as here, there is a pending criminal prosecution.”) 
 96 See id. at  112  (”We  are  not  prepared  to  infer that section 355.1(f) provides full use and deriva-
tive use immunity for compelled testimony, contrary to the explicit language of the statute.”)  (internal  
quotations omitted); People v. Campbell, 187 Cal. Rptr. 340, 345 (Ct. App. 1982) (finding that the court 
is bound by the conditions and scope of immunity as provided in the statute).  Even Kastigar does not 
authorize a judicial grant of immunity absent statutory authority. 
[Kastigar] held only that, pursuant to statutory authority to confer such immunity, the Gov-
ernment may constitutionally compel incriminating testimony in exchange for immunity 
from use or derivative use of that testimony.  Kastigar does not hold that a trial judge, act-
ing without statutory authority to grant immunity, may . . . overrule an otherwise valid as-
sertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege. 
Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 267 (1983) (Marshall, J. concurring) (citing Kastigar v. 
United States, 406 U.S. 441, 462 (1972)). 
 97 Campbell, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 345; CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §  1858  (West  2007)  (“In  the  construc-
tion of a statute or instrument, the office of the Judge is simply to ascertain and declare what is in terms 
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the court with authority to compel testimony need not grant use and deriva-
tive use immunity.98  Thus, if the legislature intended to compel testimony, 
the statute would expressly say so and would provide for the requisite use 
and derivative use immunity.99  Because Section 355.1(f) says nothing 
about compelling testimony and only grants limited testimonial immunity, 
it is reasonable to infer that the legislature did not intend to grant the court 
authority to compel parents to testify.100  A dependency court must not read 
such broad immunity into the statute, but “should stay its hand and let the 
legislature decide whether the statute needs to be amended.”101 
Similarly, a unilateral judicial grant of immunity may encroach upon 
the discretion of the executive branch.102  A prosecutor, like the legislature, 
may have legitimate reasons for granting limited testimonial immunity, 
even though the scope of that immunity is insufficient to compel a wit-
ness’s testimony.103  If a witness is compelled to testify under a grant of use 
and derivative use immunity, the prosecution in a subsequent criminal pro-
ceeding has an “affirmative duty to prove that the evidence . . . is derived 
from a legitimate source wholly independent of the compelled testimo-
ny,”104 thereby increasing the prosecutorial burden.105  Thus, a prosecutor 
may wish to forgo a grant of such immunity.  Furthermore, the criminal 
prosecutor is often not a party to the dependency matter and may have little 
interest, if any, in granting immunity to parents in dependency proceed-
ings.106  As such, it makes sense that current California law involves the 
prosecutor in the decision to grant immunity.107 
 
or in substance contained therein, not to insert what has been omitted, or to omit what has been in-
serted”). 
 98 See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 408 (1976) (acknowledging that the Fifth Amend-
ment is not implicated unless testimony is compelled). 
 99 E.g., CAL. CT. R. 5.548(b) (expressly granting  a  judge  the  authority  to  compel  a  witness’s  tes-
timony by following specified procedures and providing the necessary use and derivative use immunity 
therefor). 
 100 See Patton, supra note 87, at 122–27 (demonstrating that the California legislature was not at-
tempting to compel parents to testify, but was merely trying to ease the harsh presumption of abuse that 
a parent must overcome under the statute). 
 101 In re Elan E., 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 528, 532 (Ct. App. 2000). 
 102 See supra note 92; see also In re Mark A., 68 Cal. Rptr.3d 106, 113 (Ct. App. 2007) (confirm-
ing that   “law   enforcement   and   the   prosecution   of   crimes   is   part   of   the executive branch of govern-
ment”). 
 103 See, e.g., United States v. Pielago, 135 F.3d 703, 710 (11th Cir. 1998) (regarding a valid prof-
fer  agreement  which  permitted  the  government   to  pursue  investigative  leads  derived  from  a  witness’s  
testimony and to use the evidence derived from those leads against the witness in a subsequent criminal 
proceeding). 
 104 Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 460 (1972). 
 105 See United States v. Turkish,  623  F.2d  769,  775  (2d  Cir.  1980)  (indicating  that  “while  the  pros-
ecution remains theoretically free under Kastigar to prosecute a witness granted use immunity, the ob-
stacles  to  a  successful  prosecution  can  be  substantial”). 
 106 In re Mark A., 68 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 113 n.4 (“The appearance of the district attorney in a juvenile 
dependency case is rare, at least in Orange County.”). 
 107 CAL. CT. R. 5.548(d) (requiring the dependency court to give the prosecution notice and an 
opportunity to be heard before granting immunity to a parent). 
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Just as the criminal prosecutor is often not a party to dependency mat-
ters, dependency judges act within a specialized court system entirely dis-
tinct from the adult criminal system.108  Dependency judges may be more 
interested in the resolution of the dependency matter and less interested or 
familiar with criminal prosecution.  When this is the case, a unilateral deci-
sion to immunize or compel a parent’s testimony may not account for the 
increased burden imposed on the criminal prosecution or the statutory plan 
approved by the citizenry.  Rather, the decision may focus primarily upon 
the preferences and interests of the parties involved in the dependency mat-
ter (e.g., the minor or guardian ad litem acting on behalf of the minor, the 
social services agency, another parent or guardian, potential foster or adop-
tive parents, or prospective placements for the child) and the judicial offic-
er’s interest in hearing all available evidence necessary to make an in-
formed disposition of the case.109  Thus, a dependency court should not 
endeavor to immunize or compel a parent’s testimony on its own motion 
and without statutory authority. 
D. The Exclusionary Rule is meant to Deter Constitutional Violations, 
Not to Supplant a Parent’s Fifth Amendment Privilege 
When parents are improperly compelled to testify absent a grant of the 
proper level of immunity, their Fifth Amendment privilege may be pro-
tected by the exclusionary rule.  Under this rule, when a witness is com-
pelled to answer in violation of the right to remain silent, he or she may ob-
ject to the admission of the compelled answers, and any evidence derived 
from them, in a subsequent criminal action.110  Thus, a parent who is or-
dered to testify against a valid claim of Fifth Amendment privilege may be 
automatically vested with protection coextensive with the Fifth Amend-
ment.111  However, reliance on the exclusionary rule as a tool to compel 
self-incrimination contradicts the Fifth Amendment mandate.  The fact that 
the Fifth Amendment may be violated in a case that never reaches trial de-
monstrates that the privilege is more than a constitutional rule of eviden-
tiary admissibility or exclusion.112  Furthermore, the exclusionary rule is 
 
 108 See supra note 29; cf. In re Noel N., 465 N.Y.S.2d 1008, 1008 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1983) (finding 
that a family court has limited jurisdiction and a family court judge may not grant immunity to a wit-
ness in a delinquency proceeding). 
 109 E.g., In re Joanna Y., 10  Cal.  Rptr.  2d  422,  426  (Ct.  App.  1992)  (improperly  stating  that  “the  
privilege against self-incrimination is inapplicable in child welfare proceedings because all relevant 
evidence should be disclosed to protect the paramount interest of the safety and welfare  of  the  child.”).    
But see In re Mark A., 68 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 118 (finding that the above statement in Joanna Y.  was  “clear-
ly  wrong.”). 
 110 Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 78 (1973) (noting that where a witness is not granted use and 
derivative use immunity, but “he   is   nevertheless   compelled   to   answer,   his   answers   are   inadmissible 
against  him  in  a  later  criminal  prosecution.”). 
 111 Adams  v.  Maryland,  347  U.S.  179,  181  (1954)  (“A  witness  does  not  need  any  statute  to  protect 
him from the use of self-incriminating testimony he is compelled to give over his objection.  The Fifth 
Amendment  takes  care  of  that  without  a  statute.”). 
 112 See Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 805 (1977) (finding that, when the government 
compels testimony by threatening to inflict  sanctions  and  does  not  guarantee  immunity,  “that  testimony  
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meant to deter unlawful violations of the Fifth Amendment,113 and is in no 
way a substitute for a guaranteed grant of immunity sufficient to compel a 
parent’s testimony.114  As such, a dependency court cannot rely on the ex-
clusionary rule to support its own violation of the Constitution. 
E. California Dependency Courts may Currently Compel a Parent’s 
Testimony by Following the Procedure Set Forth in California Rules 
of Court 5.548 
California Rule of Court 5.548 sets forth the procedure to grant par-
ents use and derivative use immunity and authorizes the dependency court 
to compel their testimony.115  Although this procedure has been on the 
books for over a decade, parents have not been consistently afforded its 
protection.116  This may be due to the false assumption that Section 355.1(f) 
of the California Welfare & Institutions Code provides the necessary level 
of immunity,117 or simply because dependency courts have erroneously 
found the Fifth Amendment privilege inapplicable.118  In addition, the So-
cial Services Agency and the criminal prosecution essentially control the 
initiation of the immunity statute,119 and both are more likely to benefit 
where the parent remains silent.120 
 
is obtained in  violation  of   the  Fifth  Amendment”)   (emphasis  added);;   see also Turley, 414 U.S. at 83 
(holding that disqualification from public contracting as a penalty for asserting the privilege, without a 
guarantee of immunity, violates the Fifth Amendment). 
 113 Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960). 
 114 As the Supreme Court eloquently stated in Maness v. Meyers:  “[R]eliance upon a later objec-
tion  or  motion  to  suppress  would  ‘let the  cat  out’  with  no  assurance  whatever  of  putting  it  back.”  419  
U.S. 449, 463 (1975).  In Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, the Supreme Court elaborated that a civil trial court 
lacks   the  power   to  grant   immunity   (except   as   authorized  by   statute),   and   a   “[c]ourt's compulsion or-
der . . .  cannot  not  be  justified  by  the  subsequent  exclusion  of  the  compelled  testimony.”   459 U.S. 248, 
261–62 (1983).  In In re Mark A., the California court of appeal agreed: 
[R]ules of evidence—applicable in a subsequent criminal proceeding—do not constitute an 
automatic grant of use and derivative use immunity sufficient to compel testimony over a 
Fifth Amendment objection; they do not represent the decision of the executive to request 
immunized testimony; and they do not give absolute assurance to the witness that another 
court on a later date will agree that information arguably derived from that testimony will 
be excluded. 
68 Cal. Rptr. 3d 106, 117 (Ct. App. 2007). 
 115 CAL. CT. R. 5.548(d). 
 116 Prior to January 1, 2007, California Rule of Court 1421 provided a similar procedure.  Origi-
nally  effective  beginning  January  1,  1990,  the  statute  was  amended  in  1998  to  clarify  that  “no  testimony 
or other information compelled under the order [to testify] or information directly or indirectly derived 
from  the  testimony  or    other  information,  may  be  used  against  the  witness  in  any  criminal  case.”    CAL. 
CT. R. 5.548. 
 117 See, e.g., In re Mark A., 68 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 108; In re Brenda M., 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 686, 688 
(Ct. App. 2008); In re Jessica B., 254 Cal. Rptr. 883, 892 (Ct. App. 1989). 
 118 See, e.g., In re Joanna Y., 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 422, 426 (Ct. App. 1992). 
 119 CAL. CT. R. 5.548(c). 
 120 See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 355.1(a) (West 2007) (providing for a presumption of abuse 
against a parent who does not present evidence to the contrary); Turkish v. United States, 623 F.2d 769, 
775  (2d  Cir.  1980)  (noting  that,  under  a  grant  of  immunity,  “the  obstacles  to  a  successful  prosecution  
can  be  substantial.”). 
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Pursuant to Rule 5.548, the Social Services Agency or the prosecuting 
attorney may request that the court order a parent to testify or to present 
evidence.121  If the Social Services Agency and the prosecuting attorney 
jointly make the request, the judge must generally grant it.122  Rule 5.548 
further provides that, “any answer given, evidence produced, or informa-
tion derived there from must not be used against the witness in a 
. . . criminal proceeding,”123 thus granting “protection commensurate with 
that afforded by the [Fifth Amendment] privilege.”124  However, if the re-
quest is made solely by Social Services, the criminal prosecutor “must be 
given the opportunity to show why immunity is not to be granted.”125  The 
current procedure ensures that the criminal prosecutor has notice and an 
opportunity to be heard before the dependency court can compel a parent’s 
testimony and grant the requisite immunity.  If immunity is granted, the in-
creased burden on the criminal prosecution attaches, serving as a disincen-
tive for the prosecutor to seek such immunity.126  In addition, the Social 
Services Agency benefits from the presumption of abuse against a parent 
where the parent is unable to present evidence to the contrary.127  Thus, it is 
not surprising that this procedure is under-utilized. 
IV.  GRANTING USE AND DERIVATIVE USE IMMUNITY TO ALL 
PARENTS WHILE EXCLUDING PROSECUTORS FROM 
DEPENDENCY MATTERS WILL ALLOW DEPENDENCY COURTS TO 
LAWFULLY ACCESS ALL RELEVANT INFORMATION WITHOUT 
INTERFERING WITH THE PROSECUTION OF CRIMES 
Parents are currently unable to voluntarily testify in their child’s case 
without risking their Fifth Amendment privilege.128  In addition, dependen-
cy courts may not compel parents’ testimony without involving the crimi-
nal prosecutor.129  Because the interests of dependency courts, prosecutors, 
and parents often conflict, it is unlikely that immunity will be granted in 
exchange for parental testimony under the current statutory scheme.130  To 
ensure that dependency courts can routinely hear such testimony, Califor-
nia Welfare and Institutions Code section 355.1 should be amended to pro-
vide all parents blanket use and derivative use immunity. 
 
 121 CAL. CT. R. 5.548(c). 
 122 Id. at 5.548(d). 
 123 Id. at 5.548(d)(3). 
 124 Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972). 
 125 CAL. CT. R. 5.548(d)(1). 
 126 Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 460. 
 127 See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 355.1(a) (West 2007). 
 128 Compare id. § 355.1(f) (providing mere testimonial immunity to a parent who voluntarily testi-
fies), with CAL. CT. R. 5.548(d)(3) (providing use and derivative use immunity when a parent is com-
pelled to testify). 
 129 CAL. CT. R. 5.548(d). 
 130 See supra notes 120–120, 126–127 and accompanying text. 
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For such immunity to be effective, prosecuting agencies should be 
completely excluded from dependency proceedings to ensure they cannot 
access a parent’s testimony.  While such agencies currently have a strong 
interest in the decision to immunize a parent’s testimony, their exclusion 
will alleviate the accompanying prosecutorial burden.131  A prosecuting 
agency that receives notice of a parent’s alleged abuse or neglect from law 
enforcement or the social worker, but is denied access to the child’s depen-
dency case file, remains free to base its investigation solely on independent 
sources without question as to how the information was discovered. 
California law allows prosecuting agencies to be immensely involved 
in dependency matters.  When a parent is charged with criminal acts 
against a child, the prosecuting attorney may step in to represent the minor 
on behalf of the state in the dependency matter.132  The prosecutor may also 
represent both the child in the dependency proceeding and the state in a 
criminal proceeding against the parent, based on the same set of facts.133  
Even if the prosecutor is not involved in the dependency matter, the prose-
cutor and law enforcement have statutory rights to access the minor’s case 
file, including the parent’s testimony.134  This creates a risk that the testi-
mony will be used against the parent in a criminal proceeding, regardless of 
whether the parent accepts mere testimonial immunity or is compelled to 
testify under a grant of use and derivative use immunity.  The legislative 
intent to encourage parental testimony is thus undermined if parents refuse 
to testify out of fear that their testimony may be used against them.135  Fur-
thermore, parents who are unaware that their testimony has been accessed 
will also be unaware if any information derived from it is admitted in their 
criminal case.  Consequently, even the exclusionary rule will not protect 
parents if they do not know to object.136 
Parental testimony and psychological reports should not be discovera-
ble by prosecutors.  However, the prosecutor should be allowed to petition 
the dependency court for access to the parents’ dependency-related disclo-
sures for impeachment purposes137 or, if the parent chooses to testify in the 
criminal matter, for purposes of prosecution for perjury.138  The juvenile 
 
 131 Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 461–62 (1972) (establishing that the prosecution has a 
“heavy  burden”  to  prove  that  its  evidence  has  not been  obtained  as  a  result  of  a  defendant’s  immunized  
testimony).  If the trier of fact finds that the prosecution had no means to access immunized testimony, 
such a burden could easily be lifted. 
 132 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 681(b) (West 2007). 
 133 Id. § 317(c)  (providing  that  such  an  arrangement  “is  not  in  and  of  itself  a  conflict  of  interest.”). 
 134 Id. § 827(a)(1)(B), (E). 
 135 E.g., In re Mark A., 68 Cal. Rptr. 3d 106, 110–11 (Ct. App. 2007) (involving a father who re-
fused to testify despite a court order). 
 136 See cases cited supra note 114. 
 137 See People v. Hathcock, 95 Cal. Rptr. 221, 223. (Ct. App. 1971) (“[A] witness who testifies at 
a trial waives his privilege against self-incrimination as to any question which is thereafter asked to test 
the  credulity  of  his  testimony”). 
 138 See Mackey  v.  United  States,  401  U.S.  667,  705   (1971)   (“[E]ven  when   the  privilege  against  
self-incrimination permits an individual to refuse to answer questions asked by the Government, if false 
answers  are  given  the  individual  may  be  prosecuted  for  making  false  statements.”);;  CAL. PENAL CODE § 
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court should confidentially determine whether the parent’s testimony in the 
dependency and criminal proceedings truly conflict and limit access to the 
relevant portions of the testimony.  This method will shelter the testimony 
from prosecutorial misuse, lessen the burden on prosecutors to prove that 
the evidence came from an independent source, and prevent abuse by per-
juring parents. 
A statutory scheme limiting mandated disclosure requirements will al-
so foster parents’ openness in court-ordered therapy.  Statements relating to 
the children in the dependency matter should be disclosed to the dependen-
cy court, rather than to law enforcement or the district attorney.  This will 
allow the dependency court to protect the children while preventing the un-
constitutional use of the compelled incriminating statements against a par-
ent in a subsequent trial.  Furthermore, parents will more fully participate 
in rehabilitative services when they trust that their disclosures will remain 
confidential, and they will provide the dependency court with the informa-
tion it needs to resolve the case in the best interests of the child. 
CONCLUSION 
California’s dependency law currently compels parents to testify upon 
the threat of losing their children.  Parents who face both the possibility of 
losing their child and the threat of criminal prosecution are forced to 
choose between cooperating with the dependency court to preserve their 
parental rights or risking the loss of their child to preserve their Fifth 
Amendment privilege.  When parents invoke the Fifth Amendment privi-
lege in their child’s dependency case, California dependency courts cur-
rently have only two options: (1) proceed without the testimony to resolve 
the child’s case; or (2) involve the prosecutor and grant parents the neces-
sary use and derivative use immunity to compel them to testify. 
Failure to provide parents with use and derivative use immunity vi-
olates their Fifth Amendment privilege and runs contrary to the best inter-
ests of the child, who deserves to have his or her case decided based upon 
all relevant information.  Thus, all parents should be granted statutory use 
and derivative use immunity so that they may fully participate in depen-
dency proceedings and court-ordered therapy.  For such immunity to be ef-
fective, and to alleviate any potential prosecutorial burden, prosecutors 
must be excluded from dependency matters.  The dependency court will 
have increased access to all relevant information to protect California’s 
most vulnerable children; and prosecutors will be as free to prosecute as if 
the testimony never existed. 
 
14 (West 2007); CAL. CT. R. 5.548(e) (expressly stating that where parents are granted immunity and 
compelled to testify in a dependency  matter,  they  still  “may  be subject to proceedings under the juvenile 
court  law  or  to  criminal  prosecution  for  perjury”);;  In re Joanna Y., 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 422, 426 n.10 (Ct. 
App.  1992)  (“[T]he purpose of use immunity is to secure truthful testimony, not to license perjury”). 
